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Author SHA1 Message Date
Zac
72fc608d8a fix(mam-api): harden TOTP login flow + tighten Google domain check
Review of the v2 auth landing turned up four weak spots in the MFA path.
All four are now fixed; behaviour is unchanged for the password-correct
+ correct-TOTP happy path.

1. TOTP brute-force gate (the big one). /login was calling
   ipBackoff.recordSuccess(ip) the instant the password hashed correctly,
   *before* the second factor was proven. That cleared the per-IP failure
   counter, so each /login retry let an attacker with a known password
   hammer the 6-digit /login/totp space (10^6) at full speed.
   Now recordSuccess fires only inside establishSession() — i.e. after
   every required factor has actually passed (password [+TOTP] or
   OAuth [+TOTP]).

2. MFA ticket binding. Tickets issued by /login (and the Google callback)
   were unbound — a stolen ticket replayed from a different origin still
   worked. Tickets now carry SHA-256 hashes of the issuing request's IP
   and User-Agent; redeemTicket rejects on mismatch. The ticket is burned
   even on mismatch so a wrong-binding probe can't be retried.

3. TOTP replay within the same 30s step (RFC 6238 §5.2). The verifier
   accepted the same code as many times as you submitted it. Now
   verifyToken returns the matched counter, and /login/totp does a CAS
   UPDATE on users.totp_last_counter — codes at counters <= the last
   accepted value are rejected. New migration 030 adds totp_last_counter,
   seeded on /totp/enable so the enrollment code itself can't be reused
   at first login, and zeroed on /totp/disable.

4. Google OAuth domain check no longer falls back to the email suffix
   when the hd (hosted-domain) claim is missing. Email-suffix matching
   let consumer (non-Workspace) Google accounts whose email happens to
   end in the allowed domain through; if GOOGLE_ALLOWED_DOMAIN is set,
   the operator means "only this Workspace", so accounts without a
   verified hd must be rejected.

Tests: new mfa-tickets.test.js covers ip/UA binding, single-use on
mismatch, and bindings-absent back-compat. totp.test.js updated for the
new verifyToken return shape (counter on success, null on failure;
truthiness still works at call sites) and adds an explicit
matched-counter check.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-30 12:52:53 +00:00
Zac
fff0828d79 feat(mam-api,web-ui): TOTP two-factor authentication
Optional time-based 2FA on top of password login. TOTP core is hand-rolled
on node:crypto (RFC 6238) — no runtime dep — and verified against the RFC
test vectors.

- migration 027: users.totp_secret/totp_enabled + user_recovery_codes
- src/auth/totp.js: base32, secret gen, RFC 6238 verify, otpauth URI,
  recovery codes
- src/auth/mfa-tickets.js: short-lived single-use tickets bridging the two
  login steps (in-memory, single-instance like the rate-limiter)
- auth routes: /totp/setup, /totp/enable (returns recovery codes once),
  /totp/disable (password-confirmed); login returns {mfa_required, ticket}
  when enabled, /login/totp completes with a code or recovery code
- /auth/me and loadUser surface totp_enabled
- web-ui: login second-factor step; Settings -> Account TOTP enroll (QR +
  manual secret + recovery codes + disable)
- qrcode added as an optional dep; setup degrades to manual entry if absent
- tests: totp unit (RFC vectors) + integration (enable/login/recovery/disable)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-30 02:42:57 +00:00