dragonflight/services/mam-api/src/middleware/auth.js

/**
 * Authentication middleware.
 *
 * When AUTH_ENABLED=true in the environment, every protected route requires
 * either:
 *   - An active session (set by POST /api/v1/auth/login), or
 *   - A valid Bearer token in the Authorization header.
 *
 * When AUTH_ENABLED is unset or any other value, the middleware is a no-op
 * (with a synthetic admin user attached) so the stack can run unprotected.
 *
 * Exposed on `req` after success:
 *   req.user             { id, username, role, is_client }
 *   req.tokenBoundHostname  hostname binding from api_tokens, or null
 */
import crypto from 'crypto';
import pool   from '../db/pool.js';

const SYNTHETIC_USER = Object.freeze({
  id:        null,
  username:  'operator',
  role:      'admin',
  is_client: false,
  synthetic: true,
});

export const requireAuth = async (req, res, next) => {
  if (process.env.AUTH_ENABLED !== 'true') {
    req.user = SYNTHETIC_USER;
    return next();
  }

  // ── Session-based auth ─────────────────────────────────────────
  if (req.session?.userId) {
    req.user = {
      id:        req.session.userId,
      username:  req.session.username,
      role:      req.session.role,
      is_client: !!req.session.isClient,
    };
    return next();
  }

  // ── Bearer token auth ──────────────────────────────────────────
  const authHeader = req.headers.authorization;
  if (authHeader?.startsWith('Bearer ')) {
    const raw  = authHeader.slice(7).trim();
    const hash = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(raw).digest('hex');
    try {
      const { rows } = await pool.query(
        `SELECT t.user_id AS id,
                u.username, u.role, u.is_client,
                t.bound_hostname
           FROM api_tokens t
           JOIN users u ON u.id = t.user_id
          WHERE t.token_hash = $1
            AND (t.expires_at IS NULL OR t.expires_at > NOW())`,
        [hash]
      );
      if (rows.length > 0) {
        const row = rows[0];
        req.user = {
          id:        row.id,
          username:  row.username,
          role:      row.role,
          is_client: !!row.is_client,
        };
        req.tokenBoundHostname = row.bound_hostname || null;
        pool.query(
          'UPDATE api_tokens SET last_used_at = NOW() WHERE token_hash = $1',
          [hash]
        ).catch(() => {});
        return next();
      }
    } catch (err) {
      return next(err);
    }
  }

  return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Unauthorized' });
};

export const requireAdmin = (req, res, next) => {
  if (process.env.AUTH_ENABLED !== 'true') return next();
  if (req.user?.role === 'admin') return next();
  return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Admin access required' });
};

/**
 * Role gate: `requireRole(['admin','editor'])` rejects with 403 unless the
 * user's role is in the allow list. Always passes when AUTH_ENABLED=false.
 * Optionally pass { rejectClients: true } to also block users with
 * is_client=true regardless of role — used for routes that touch the
 * recorder / cluster / infra surface.
 */
export const requireRole = (allowed, opts = {}) => {
  const set = new Set(Array.isArray(allowed) ? allowed : [allowed]);
  const { rejectClients = false } = opts;
  return (req, res, next) => {
    if (process.env.AUTH_ENABLED !== 'true') return next();
    if (!req.user || !set.has(req.user.role)) {
      return res.status(403).json({ error: `Requires role: ${[...set].join(' or ')}` });
    }
    if (rejectClients && req.user.is_client) {
      return res.status(403).json({ error: 'This action is not available to client accounts' });
    }
    next();
  };
};